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Abstract
I study sequential first-price auctions where two items are sold to two bidders with
private binary valuations. A seller, prior to the second auction, can publicly disclose
some information about the outcome of the first auction. I characterize equilibrium
strategies for various disclosure rules when the valuations of bidders are either per-
fectly positively or perfectly negatively correlated across items. I establish outcome
equivalence between different disclosure rules. I find that it is optimal for the seller
to disclose some information when the valuations are negatively correlated, whereas
it is optimal not to disclose any information when the valuations are positively corre-
lated. For most of the parameter values, the seller’s expected revenue is higher if the
losing bid is disclosed. When only the winner’s identity is disclosed, the equilibrium
is efficient whether the valuations are positively or negatively correlated.
Keywords Efficiency · Information disclosure · Seller’s revenue · Sequential
first-price auctions
JEL Classification D44 · D47 · D82
1 Introduction
Auction houses like Sotheby’s and Christie’s usually sell multiple items in a sequence
on the same auction day. At the Aalsmeer Flower Auction in the Netherlands, many
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lots of flowers are sold continuously each day. Governments across the world procure
goods and services through auctions. Even though a single procurement contract might
be awarded in a particular auction, these auctions are often recurring events with the
same set of bidders. Because of the sequential nature of auctions in these examples,
the auctioneers have a choice how much information to disclose about the outcomes
of earlier auctions prior to the start of next auction.
I study this question in a setup where an auctioneer sells two items sequentially
using first-price auctions to two bidders, whose valuations for each item can take one
of two possible values. I consider the following disclosure rules by the seller: (1)
disclose both the winning and losing bids of the first auction, (2) only the winning bid,
(3) only the losing bid, (4) only the winner’s identity, or (5) do not disclose anything.
The objective is to identify among these disclosure rules the one that maximizes the
seller’s expected revenue.12
Although the bidders’ valuations of the items are assumed to be independent across
bidders, they are correlated across items. Specifically, I consider two extreme cases.
The first case considered is when the item valuations are perfectly negatively corre-
lated, meaning, if a bidder has a high value for one item, then he has a low value for
the other item and vice versa. The second case considered is when the item valuations
are perfectly positively correlated, meaning, a bidder has either high or low values
for both items.3 By considering these two extreme cases, one can verify whether the
optimal disclosure rule depends on the prior distribution of valuations.
The assumption of valuations being perfectly positively correlated is standard in
the literature (to be discussed in Sect. 1.1). To justify the case of negative correla-
tion, suppose two paintings, say, one by Rembrandt and the other by Picasso, are
auctioned. One can imagine that each participating bidder has strong interest in one of
the paintings because it would better complement his collection, but the other bidders
are unsure which painting it is. Alternatively, the auctioned items can be physically
located at different places (as is often the case in the auctions of natural resources
like timber) and a bidder must incur transportation costs to collect them. If a bidder is
located closer to one item than the other, then because of the transportation costs, he
will attach higher value to the former item. Further, if other bidders are unsure about
this bidder’s location (for example, because the bidder’s true identity is unknown),
this creates uncertainty about his valuations.
I establish a set of results. First of all, I find equilibrium bidding strategies in
the sequential first-price auctions for each combination of disclosure rule and the
correlation of valuations (that is, ten different cases in total). Once the equilibrium
strategies are found, I compare the seller’s revenue from different disclosure rules
to find the following. If the valuations of items are negatively correlated, then it is
1 I only look for the optimal disclosure rule between the five rules that I consider, but I show in Sect. 5.4
that there can be even better disclosure rules.
2 In the continuation, I will often refer to expected revenue simply as revenue. Since I only consider expected
revenue, it should not cause confusion. The same comment also applies to surplus and bidder’s payoff.
3 The case of perfectly negatively correlated valuations can be extended to more than two items by assuming
that a bidder attaches a high value to exactly one item, while the case of perfectly positively correlated
valuations can be extended by assuming that a bidder either attaches high values to all items or to none at
all.
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beneficial for the seller to disclose some information, whereas if the valuations are
positively correlated, then any information disclosure harms the seller.
The intuition for this result is as follows. If the seller discloses some information
from the first auction, it allows the bidders to update their beliefs about the opponent.
This, in turn, gives incentives to the bidders to conceal information about their val-
uations in the first auction. In particular, a bidder who has high value for the second
item, benefits if he is perceived by the opponent as someone who has low value for
that item because then the bidding in the second auction will be less aggressive.
The consequences from concealing their true valuations depend on the correlation
of valuations across items. If the valuations are perfectly negatively correlated, then
type (0, 1) bidder4 tries to disguise himself as type (1, 0) bidder. Because the latter
type bids aggressively for the first item, it means that type (0, 1) bidder must also
bid relatively aggressively for that item even though his valuation of the item is low.
In equilibrium, he even bids above his valuation of the first item with a positive
probability. As a result, what type (0, 1) bidder gains in the second auction, he loses
from more aggressive bidding in the first auction, so that his overall payoff is exactly
the same that he would obtain if there was no information disclosure.5 In turn, type
(1, 0) bidder is strictly worse off: he loses from more aggressive bidding in the first
auction, but he does not benefit from less aggressive bidding in the second auction.
Because this type loses, the seller gains although not necessarily to the same extent as
some surplus can be lost due to inefficient allocation of items.
If the valuations are perfectly positively correlated, then type (1, 1) bidder tries to
disguise himself as type (0, 0) bidder. Because the latter type does not bid aggressively
for the first item, it means that type (1, 1) bidder also does not bid too aggressively for
that item even though his valuation is high.6 Consequently, the seller loses from less
aggressive bidding in both auctions and is better off by not disclosing any information.
I also establish outcome equivalence between various disclosure rules, which
is summarized in Table 1. Interestingly, which rules are outcome equivalent again
depends on the correlation between valuations. Thus, I find that disclosing the win-
ning bid is equivalent to disclosing both bids if the valuations are negatively correlated,
but it is equivalent to disclosing the winner’s identity if the valuations are positively
correlated. And it is opposite for the losing bid.
The intuition for these results can also be related back to the information updating
between the first and second auctions and to the properties of the equilibrium in the
second auction. At the start of the second auction, each bidder assigns some probability
that the opponent has low value for the second item. Let’s refer to the bidder who has
higher probability of having low value as the weak bidder. Roughly, all that matters
for the equilibrium payoffs in the second auction is the probability with which the
4 The type will be denoted by an ordered pair (i, j) ∈ {0, 1}2, where the first and second entries indicate
bidder’s valuations of the first and second items, respectively, while 0 stands for “low value” and 1 for “high
value”. Note, however, the high value will not necessarily be equal to 1, although the low value will always
be normalized to 0.
5 His payoff would be strictly higher if the other type bid as he does when no information is disclosed.
However, type (1, 0) bidder adjusts his strategy to more aggressive bidding by type (0, 1) bidder.
6 Bidding low in the first auction involves a cost to type (1, 1) bidder: the possibility of losing a high value
item. Therefore, different types still bid differently in the equilibrium.
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Table 1 Equivalence and
efficiency of disclosure rules Disclosure rule Correlation
Negative Positive
Winning bid Both bids Winner’s identity
Inefficient Efficient
Losing bid Winner’s identity Both bids
Efficient Inefficient
weak bidder has low value. Next, one can ask which of the two bidders—the winner
or the loser of the first auction—is more likely to be the weak bidder.
When the valuations are negatively correlated, then between the types (1, 0) and
(0, 1), it is likelier that the former type will win the first auction. Therefore, the winner
of the first auction will be perceived as the weak bidder in the second auction. This
intuitively explains why, on one hand, those disclosure rules that reveal the winner’s
bid are equivalent and, on the other hand, those disclosure rules that do not reveal
the winner’s bid are equivalent. When the valuations are positively correlated, then
between the types (0, 0) and (1, 1), it is likelier that the latter type will win the first
auction. Therefore, the loser of the first auction will be perceived as the weak bidder
in the second auction. This again explains why, on one hand, those disclosure rules
that reveal the loser’s bid are equivalent and, on the other hand, those disclosure rules
that do not reveal the loser’s bid are equivalent.
One can also be more specific on the revenue ranking of the disclosure rules.
Given the equivalence between different disclosure rules, it is enough to compare the
revenues from disclosing the winning bid against disclosing the losing bid. I find that
irrespective of the sign of correlation, for most of the parameter values, the bidders bid
more aggressively when the losing bid is announced, leading to lower payoffs to the
bidders and higher revenue to the seller. Though, as argued before, if the valuations are
positively correlated, then any information disclosure is dominated by no disclosure.
There also exists a close relationship between the disclosure rule and the efficiency
of the equilibrium outcome in the first auction.7 I find that the equilibrium is inefficient
(resp., efficient) when the bid of the weak bidder is disclosed (resp., not disclosed).
Therefore, if the objective of the seller is to implement an efficient outcome irrespective
of the sign of correlation between the valuations of the items, she should only announce
the winner’s identity.
To understand this connection between the disclosure rule and efficiency, consider,
for example, the case of negatively correlated valuations. Suppose there is an efficient
and, consequently, separating equilibrium in the first auction and both bidders are of
type (0, 1). When the winning bid (that is, the bid of the weak bidder) is disclosed,
it becomes common knowledge that both bidders are of type (0, 1) and they bid
aggressively in the second auction. To avoid it, type (0, 1) wants to pool with the other
type and, as a result, the equilibrium is inefficient. On the other hand, when only the
losing bid is disclosed, the loser still faces uncertainty about the type of the winner and
7 Because of the assumption of binary valuations, the equilibrium outcome of the second auction is always
efficient.
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the bidding in the second auction is not so aggressive. This removes the need for type
(0, 1) to pool with the other type. Similar intuition applies to the case with positively
correlated valuations.
Finally, I check how robust the results are to departures from the benchmark model.
Thus, I consider examples of imperfectly correlated valuations, asymmetric bidders,
and more than two bidders. I find that most of the results continue to hold in the
case of imperfectly correlated valuations, suggesting that the assumption of perfectly
correlated valuations is not that restrictive. Also, when the bidders are asymmetric
and the valuations are negatively correlated, the seller still benefits from disclosing
the winning bid, but the equivalence between disclosing the winning bid and both
bids does not hold anymore. Similarly, having more than two bidders changes the
equivalence results between different disclosure rules. Thus, I find that with negatively
correlated valuations, announcing the winning bid is now equivalent to not announcing
anything. Finally, for the case of negatively correlated valuations, I also provide an
example of more complicated disclosure rule that outperforms the disclosure rules
considered so far. In particular, I assume that the seller announces the winning bid if
it is below some threshold value, otherwise she announces the losing bid.
1.1 Related literature
I am not the first to study information disclosure in sequential auctions when bidders
have multi-unit demand and they know their valuations for all items before any bidding
takes place.8 To the best of my knowledge, however, all the existing studies assume
that the valuations across items are perfectly positively correlated. I am the first to
explore how the equilibrium strategies and the equilibrium outcomes depend on the
sign of correlation between the valuations of the items.
The studies closest to this one are Thomas (2010), Cason et al. (2011), Kannan
(2012) that also investigate the effects of information disclosure in sequential auc-
tions’ setup with two items and binary valuations.9 They all, however, assume that
each bidder attaches the same value to both items. Apart from covering the case of
negatively correlated valuations, I also contribute to this literature when the valuations
are perfectly positively correlated, by allowing the high values of the two items to dif-
fer. Thus, for some priors, I find that the ranking of revenues from different disclosure
rules depends on the relative sizes of the high values for both items. Additionally, I
consider a wider range of disclosure rules.
There are also other studies that use the same setup as the aforementioned studies
to explore issues other than information disclosure. Thus, Ding et al. (2010) study the
dynamics of equilibrium prices when both bids are announced; Yao and Xiao (2013)
compare the revenues from the simultaneous and sequential auctions when only the
winning bid is announced in the latter auctions; ¯Azacis and Vida (2012) illustrate
8 Jeitschko (1998) shows that even in the unit demand case, announcing the winning bid affects bidders’
beliefs and, hence, their equilibrium strategies when they have discrete valuations. However, the equilibrium
revenues in the sequential and simultaneous auctions are still the same.
9 All these studies consider procurement auctions, but it is inconsequential for the results.
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how the announcement of the winning bid naturally leads to the information exchange
between the bidders about their valuations.
Almost all studies that analyse the effects of information disclosure in sequential
auctions with multi-unit demand assume binary valuations. Two exceptions are Février
(2003) and Tu (2005), which assume that the valuations are drawn from a continuous
distribution. Similar to my results, Février (2003) finds that when the valuations are
positively correlated, the seller is better off by not disclosing any information than
announcing the winner’s identity. Tu (2005), similar to this study, considers a range
of disclosure rules, but additionally he requires the equilibrium strategies to be mono-
tonically increasing in valuations. This requirement rules out pooling equilibria and
even leads to the non-existence of equilibrium for some disclosure rules.
All studies that are cited above, assume a sequence of two auctions. Bergemann and
Hörner (2017) depart from this assumption and instead consider an infinite sequence of
auctions, but still assume binary and constant valuations. To rule out explicit collusion
by bidders, they look for equilibria in Markov strategies and establish that more infor-
mation hurts both revenue and efficiency. Similar to this study, Bergemann and Hörner
(2017) find that the only disclosure rule that ensures that an inefficient equilibrium
does not exist is the one when only the winner’s identity is disclosed.
Finally, there exists a related literature that compares various disclosure rules in a
single-item auction when bidders interact post auction.10 I mention only few exam-
ples. Information disclosure about bids matters in Lebrun (2010) because bidders can
engage in resale after the auction; in Giovannoni and Makris (2014) because bid-
ders have reputational concerns; and in Fan et al. (2016) because bidders engage in
oligopolistic competition after a cost-reducing patent has been auctioned to one of
them.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Sections 3
and 4 analyse the cases with negative and positive correlations between the valuations
of the items, respectively. Section 5 contains discussion of various extensions of the
model. Finally, most of the proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Themodel
Two bidders are competing for two items in sequential first-price auctions. I assume
that each bidder attaches to each item either a low value or a high value. The valuations
of one bidder are independent of the valuations of the other bidder. However, bidder’s
valuations can be correlated across items. The distribution of valuations, which is the
same for both bidders, is summarized in the following table:
Item 2
0 v
Item 1 0 p00 p01
1 p10 p11
10 Another interesting strand of literature (for example, Esponda 2008; Jehiel 2011) considers information
feedback from past auctions when bidders do not know the true distribution of types of other bidders.
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Without loss of generality, the low value is normalized to 0 for both items, and the
high value for the first item is normalized to 1. The high value for the second item is
v > 0. For some of the results, I will need to assume that additionally v ≤ 1. Each
bidder only knows the realization of his own valuations. I assume that bidders’ payoffs
are additive in the two items and money, as well as linear in money.
The items are sold sequentially. The bidders submit sealed bids for the first item and
the outcome of this auction is determined. At this point, a seller might disclose some
information about the outcome of the first auction. Next, the procedure is repeated for
the second item. The bidder who submits the highest bid for an item, obtains it and
pays his bid for that item. If there is a tie in either auction, I assume that it is broken
randomly, except in the second auction when bidders have different valuations. In that
case, I assume that the priority in the second auction is given to the winner of the first
auction when the valuations are positively correlated, whereas the priority is given to
the loser of the first auction when the valuations are negatively correlated. Intuitively,
in both cases, ties are broken in favor of the bidder who is more likely to have the high
value for the second item. This tie-breaking rule is needed to ensure the existence of
equilibrium.11 Note, though, that the seller can implement this tie-breaking rule based
on the information she observes (assuming that she knows the distribution of valua-
tions). Finally, I do not require the bids to be non-negative, although all equilibrium
strategies would remain the same if negative bids were ruled out. Since the assumption
that the low value is equal to 0 is just a normalization, it is natural to allow the bidders
to bid below the low value.
Before the start of the second auction, the seller has a choice how much information
to release about the outcome of the first auction. The seller can choose to disclose
both the winning and losing bids, only the winning bid, only the losing bid, only the
winner’s identity, or she can choose not to disclose anything.12 Note, though, it is
assumed that the seller commits to the chosen disclosure rule before the first item is
auctioned and the bidders know which rule the seller has chosen. The objective is to
derive equilibrium strategies and to compare the seller’s revenue from the sequential
auctions under different disclosure rules.
I adopt the perfect Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept, but additionally
I also require that no bidder uses dominated strategies in the equilibrium.13 The out-
of-equilibrium beliefs will be specified as follows: if the equilibrium bid of a bidder
in the first auction must belong to an interval
[
b, b
]
, but instead it is below b (resp.,
above b), then the beliefs about this bidder will be exactly the same as the ones if he
had bid b (resp., b).
11 The adopted tie-breaking rule is consistent with what is done elsewhere in the literature, even though
some papers make different assumptions. For example, Kannan (2012) assumes that all ties are broken
randomly. But, he also additionally assumes that if bidders with different valuations tie, then the high
valuation bidder, in fact, bids infinitesimally more, thus effectively breaking the tie in favour of this bidder.
12 More precisely, when either or both bids are disclosed, I additionally assume that each bidder also learns
whether or not he has won the first auction. This additional assumption is only needed when ties arise with
a strictly positive probability in the equilibrium of the first auction.
13 As a result of information disclosure, it can become common knowledge that one of the bidders has high
value for the second item. Then, there exists an equilibrium in the second auction, in which both bidders
submit bids equal to the high value for the second item even if one of them has low value. I rule out such
equilibria.
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Rather than solving for the equilibrium strategies for all possible distributions of
valuations, in the continuation, I consider two extreme cases: when the valuations
are perfectly negatively correlated, and when they are perfectly positively correlated.
These cases correspond to p00 = p11 = 0 and p01 = p10 = 0, respectively. In Sect. 5,
I will also consider special cases of imperfectly correlated valuations.
3 Perfectly negatively correlated valuations
I first consider the case when p00 = p11 = 0. To simplify notation, let us denote p01
by p, and p10 by 1 − p. I also assume that p ∈ (0, 1).
I start by stating the equilibrium strategies in the second auction. Let w and l denote
the winner and the loser of the first auction, respectively. For i = w, l, let qi be the
probability that bidder i is of type (1, 0). As mentioned in the Introduction, when the
valuations are negatively correlated, the winner of the first auction is perceived to be
type (1, 0) bidder with higher probability, that is, he is the weak bidder. Therefore, I
assume that qw ≥ ql . Later I will verify that this assumption is indeed satisfied.
The following lemma describes the equilibrium strategies of the second auction
whenever the probabilities qi for i = w, l are common knowledge between the oppo-
nents and qw ≥ ql .
Lemma 1 Type (1, 0) bids 0. Type (0, 1) bids v if qw = 0, and bids 0 if qw = 1. If
0 < qw < 1, then
1. Bidder w of type (0, 1) draws a bid c according to the distribution function
Gw (c) = qw1 − qw
c
v − c (1)
on the interval [0, (1 − qw)v],
2. Bidder l of type (0, 1) draws a bid c according to the distribution function
Gl (c) = qw1 − ql
v
v − c −
ql
1 − ql (2)
on the interval [0, (1 − qw)v], and puts a mass Gl(0) > 0 on bid 0 if qw > ql .
The equilibrium payoffs of types (1, 0) and (0, 1) are, respectively, 0 and qwv in
the second auction.
Because versions of this lemma have already been derived in the literature (see, for
example, Maskin and Riley (1985)), its proof is omitted.14
Lemma 1 says that a type (0, 1) bidder, irrespective of whether or not he has won
the first auction, expects a payoff of qwv in the second auction. The results of Sect. 3
that follow can be interpreted in terms of this payoff. First, if the wining bid of the
first auction is disclosed, the loser will use this bid to update his belief, qw, about the
opponent. Otherwise, he will use his own losing bid to update his belief. This explains
14 This lemma is also a special case of Lemma 15 in ¯Azacis (2019) with n ≥ 2 bidders.
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why certain disclosure rules are equivalent. Second, as I will show, qw is increasing
in the bids of the first auction whenever the seller discloses something about the
outcome of the first auction. This gives the incentives to a type (0, 1) bidder to bid
more aggressively in the first auction, which benefits the seller. Third, if 0 < qw < 1
holds when the winning bid is disclosed, the equilibrium outcome of the first auction
must be (partially) pooling and, hence, inefficient.
Let F01 (b) and F10 (b) denote the equilibrium strategies of types (0, 1) and (1, 0),
respectively, in the first auction. Also, let bw and bl denote the winning and losing
bids of the first auction, respectively.
3.1 When no information is disclosed
I start by characterizing the equilibrium strategies when no information is disclosed.
This case will serve as a benchmark. Although the assumption that a bidder does not
even learn whether or not he has won the first auction, appears extreme, note that we
can think that both items are sold simultaneously.
Proposition 2
Item 1: Type (0, 1) bids 0 and type (1, 0) draws a bid according to F10 :
[0, 1 − p] → [0, 1], where
F10 (b) = p1 − p
b
1 − b .
Item 2: The bidders bid as specified in Lemma 1, where qw = ql = 1 − p.15
The equilibrium payoffs of types (1, 0) and (0, 1) are, respectively, π10 = p and
π01 = (1 − p) v.
Because no information is disclosed between the two auctions, they can be treated
as two independent auctions. As a result, the equilibrium bidding in the first auction is
similar to the one described in Lemma 1 (with the strategies of types (1, 0) and (0, 1)
exchanged, and setting v = 1 and qw = ql = p).
The equilibrium of the sequential auctions is efficient with the surplus equal to
(1 − p)2 + p2v+2p (1 − p) (1+v), the ex ante payoff of a bidder is p(1− p)(1+v),
and the equilibrium revenue of the seller, which is the difference between the surplus
and the bidders’ payoffs, is equal to (1 − p)2 + p2v.
3.2 Only the winning bid is disclosed
Before stating the equilibrium strategies of the first auction formally, I describe them
in words. The equilibrium strategies are also illustrated for specific parameter values
in Fig. 1. Type (0, 1) bidder bids 0 with a positive probability, which is less than 1.
15 Because qw = ql , it does not matter that the bidder does not know whether he is the winner or the loser
of the first auction.
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Fig. 1 Equilibrium strategies
With the remaining probability, he bids above 0, i.e., above his valuation of the first
item. Type (1, 0) bids above 0 with probability 1. Depending on the parameter values,
either both types randomize on the same interval or the support of type (0, 1) bids
is a strict subset of the support of type (1, 0) bids. Because type (0, 1) can win the
first auction against type (1, 0) with a strictly positive probability, the equilibrium is
inefficient.
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Proposition 3
Item 1: F01 :
[
0, b¯
] → [0, 1], where
F01 (b) = F01 (0) v + b + ln (1 − b)
v(1 − b) .
If pv ≥ 1 − e−v , then F10 :
[
0, b¯
] → [0, 1], where
F10 (b) = −F01 (0) p1 − p
b + ln (1 − b)
v(1 − b) , (3)
F01 (0) = 1−b¯p and b¯ is given by v(1 − p) + b¯ + ln
(
1 − b¯) = 0.
If pv < 1−e−v , then F10 :
[
0, 1 − pv
ev−1
]
→ [0, 1], where F10(b) is defined
in (3) for b ∈ [0, b¯], and it is
F10 (b) = F01 (0) p1 − p
1
1 − b −
p
1 − p (4)
for b ∈
(
b¯, 1 − pv
ev−1
]
, F01 (0) = vev−1 < 1 and b¯ = 1 − e−v .
Item 2: The bidders bid as specified in Lemma 1, where for 0 ≤ bw ≤ b¯,16
qw = (1 − p) f10 (bw)p f01 (bw) + (1 − p) f10 (bw) = −
ln (1 − bw)
v
,
ql = (1 − p) F10 (bw)pF01 (bw) + (1 − p) F10 (bw) = −
bw + ln (1 − bw)
v
.
The equilibrium payoffs of types (1, 0) and (0, 1) are, respectively, π10 = pF01 (0)
and π01 = (1 − p) v.
The proof of this and other propositions that are omitted from the main text, can be
found in Appendix A.
The ex ante payoff of a bidder is
pπ01 + (1 − p) π10 = p (1 − p) (v + F01 (0)) .
Thus, the payoff is lower compared with the situation when no information is released.
The surplus from the auction is
(1 − p)2 × 1 + p2 × 0 + 2p (1 − p) ×
∫ b¯10
0
F01 (b) f10 (b) db
+ (1 − p)2 × 0 + p2 × v + 2p (1 − p) × v,
16 When bw = 0, qw = (1−p) f10(0)pF01(0)+(1−p) f10(0) = 0. If bw > b¯, then set qw =
(1−p) f10
(
b¯
)
p f01
(
b¯
)+(1−p) f10
(
b¯
)
.
123
H. A¯zacis
where the first line is the surplus from the first auction and the second line is the surplus
from the second auction, b¯10 = b¯ if pv ≥ 1 − e−v and b¯10 = 1 − pvev−1 otherwise.
Clearly, because the equilibrium is inefficient, the surplus of the first auction is not
maximized. The revenue of the seller is the difference between the surplus and the
bidders’ payoffs, and is given by
Rwn = (1 − p)2 + p2v + 2p (1 − p)
(∫ b¯10
0
F01 (b) f10 (b) db − F01 (0)
)
.
Because F01 (b) ≥ F01 (0) for all b, the revenue exceeds the one under no disclosure.
3.3 The winning and losing bids are disclosed
It turns out that in this case, the equilibrium payoffs of the bidders and the equilibrium
revenue of the seller are the same as in the case when only the winning bid is disclosed.
Even more, the equilibrium strategies of both types in the first auction are exactly the
same for both disclosure rules. The only change in the strategy is for type (0, 1) bidder
in the second auction after he has lost the first auction. The intuition for this result is
simple. The expected payoff of type (0, 1) bidder in the second auction only depends
on the value of qw. Whether or not the losing bid of the first auction is also disclosed
does not affect this value. Therefore, the first auction’s strategies are unaffected by the
decision to disclose the losing bid in addition to the winning bid.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium strategies are the same as in Proposition 3, except that
for 0 ≤ bl ≤ b¯,17
ql = (1 − p) f10 (bl)p f01 (bl) + (1 − p) f10 (bl) = −
ln (1 − bl)
v
.
Proof One only needs to verify two things. First, the winner’s belief about the oppo-
nent’s type at the start of the second auction, as described by ql , is indeed derived from
the strategies of the first auction using Bayes’ formula. Second, the requirement that
ql ≤ qw is also satisfied. unionsq
3.4 Only the losing bid is disclosed
The equilibrium bidding strategies in this and next subsection are only valid for v ≤
1.18 The following proposition establishes that in the first auction, types (0, 1) and
(1, 0) randomize on adjacent intervals. Therefore, the type of the loser of the first
auction (and sometimes the type of the winner) is fully revealed prior to the second
17 If bl > b¯, then ql = (1−p) f10
(
b¯
)
p f01
(
b¯
)+(1−p) f10
(
b¯
)
.
18 For v > 1, I failed to identify equilibrium strategies in the first auction. Even if one can restore the
existence of equilibrium by assuming a different tie-breaking rule or by allowing an equilibrium in weakly
dominated strategies (see Footnote 13), such an equilibrium would not be comparable with the one when
the winning bid is announced. Therefore, I only present the equilibrium strategies for v ≤ 1.
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auction. Also, the equilibrium is efficient, even though type (0, 1) bids strictly above
his valuation for the first item.
Proposition 5 Suppose v ≤ 1.19
Item 1: F01 :
[
(1 − p)v,− ln (1 − p) 1−pp v
]
→ [0, 1], where F01 is implicitly
defined by
pF01 (b) (−b) = (1 − p) ln (1 − pF01 (b)) v. (5)
F10 :
[
− ln (1 − p) 1−pp v, (1 − p) (1 − ln (1 − p) v)
]
→ [0, 1], where
F10 (b) = p1 − p
b + ln (1 − p) 1−pp v
1 − b .
Item 2: The bidders bid as specified in Lemma 1, where ql = 0 if bl ≤
− ln (1 − p) 1−pp v and ql = 1 if bl > − ln (1 − p) 1−pp v, whereas
qw = 1 − p1 − p + p (1 − F01 (bl)) . (6)
The equilibrium payoffs of types (1, 0) and (0, 1) are, respectively, π10 = p +
(1 − p) ln (1 − p) v and π01 = (1 − p)v.
Given the equilibrium strategies, the ex ante payoff of a bidder is
pπ01 + (1 − p) π10 = p (1 − p) (1 + v) + (1 − p)2 ln (1 − p) v.
Because the equilibrium of the auction is efficient, the surplus from the auction is
(1 − p)2 + p2v + 2p (1 − p) (1 + v). The revenue of the seller is
Rln = (1 − p)2 + p2v − 2 (1 − p)2 ln (1 − p) v.
3.5 Only the winner’s identity is disclosed
Now, when deriving the equilibrium strategies, one cannot apply the results of Lemma 1
to the second auction because the values of qw and ql will not be common knowledge
between the bidders. For example, the belief of the loser of the first item that the
opponent has low valuation for the second item will depend on the loser’s bid, which
is known to him but unknown to the opponent. In order to define the equilibrium
19 Given this restriction, one can verify that − ln (1 − p) 1−pp v < (1 − p) (1 − ln (1 − p) v) or, equiv-
alently, p + (1 − p) ln (1 − p) v > 0 holds. Likewise, (1 − p)v < − ln (1 − p) 1−pp v or, equivalently,
p + ln (1 − p) < 0 holds. Therefore, the supports of the equilibrium strategies are well-defined.
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strategies of the second auction in the proposition below, I introduce the following
function:
c (b) = p (1 − F01 (b))
1 − p + p (1 − F01 (b))v, (7)
where F01(b) is defined in (5) and b takes values in the interval[
(1 − p)v,− ln (1 − p) 1−pp v
]
. This function will define a mapping from the bids b
of the first auction into the bids c of the second auction. To understand its properties, let
Hw (c) ≡ 1−pp cv−c for c ∈ [0, pv]. Then, one can verify that 1− F01 (b) = Hw (c (b))
holds. Further, because H ′w (c) > 0 and F ′01 (b) > 0, it follows that c′ (b) < 0. Thus,
c (b) is monotonically decreasing in b, and takes values in the interval [0, pv]. 20
Proposition 6 Suppose v ≤ 1.
Item 1: The bidders bid as in Proposition 5.
Item 2: Type (1, 0) bids 0. Bidder w of type (0, 1) bids cw which is defined by (7) for
b = bw. Bidder l of type (0, 1) draws a bid c from the interval [0, (1 − qw)v]
according to
Hl (c) = qwv
v − c
where qw is defined in (6).21 The equilibrium payoffs of types (1, 0) and
(0, 1) are, respectively, 0 and qwv in the second auction.
Thus, in the equilibrium of the second auction, type (0, 1) loser of the first auction
draws a random bid from an interval (as is usual in the first-price auction with binary
valuations), but type (0, 1) winner of the first auction submits a bid, which is a mono-
tone transformation of his bid in the first auction. Though, as shown in the proof, from
the perspective of type (0, 1) loser, it is as if type (0, 1) winner is randomizing on the
interval [0, (1 − qw)v] according to Hw(c)Hw((1−qw)v) in the second auction. As a result,
type (0, 1) bidder, either he wins or loses the first auction, expects the same payoff of
qwv in the second auction (which he could guarantee by submitting a bid of (1−qw)v).
Interestingly, the winner of the first auction does not know the value of qw. However,
his strategy in the second auction does not depend on this value. Furthermore, because
the expression for qw is the same as the one when only the losing bid is disclosed,
the equilibrium strategies of the first auction are also the same under both disclosure
rules. As a result, the equilibrium outcome of the sequential auctions when only the
20 The inverse of function c (b) is
b (c) = − ln
(
(1 − p)v
1 − c
)
(1 − p) (v − c)
pv − c v.
21 If type (0, 1) submitted a bid b /∈
[
(1 − p)v,− ln (1 − p) 1−pp v
]
in the first auction, then he bids in
the second auction as if he had submitted b = (1 − p)v or b = − ln (1 − p) 1−pp v, whichever is closer to
his actual bid in the first auction.
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winner’s identity is disclosed, is also equivalent to the one when only the losing bid
is disclosed.22
3.6 The ranking of revenues
Given the outcome equivalence between various disclosure rules, it is enough to com-
pare the cases when only the winner’s bid or only the loser’s bid is disclosed (when
v ≤ 1). The revenue from the auction when the winner’s bid is disclosed is higher
than the revenue when only the loser’s bid is disclosed, Rwn ≥ Rln if23
n = p
(∫ b¯10
0
F01 (b) f10 (b) db − F01 (0)
)
+ (1 − p) ln (1 − p) v ≥ 0.
n = 0 is plotted in Fig. 2. For the (p, v) pairs to the right of n = 0 curve, it is
optimal for the seller to disclose the winning bid, and for the (p, v) pairs to the left of
n = 0 curve, it is optimal to disclose the losing bid. Further, if p ≤ p∗ ≈ 0.7153,
then it is not optimal to disclose the winning bid for any value of v ≤ 1. The reason
why Rln is higher for most of the parameter values, can be partly attributed to the
inefficiency of the equilibrium when the winning bid is disclosed. The main reason,
however, is that for most parameter values, the bidders appear to bid more aggressively
and, consequently, expect a lower payoff when the losing bid is disclosed. This is shown
in Fig. 2 by δn = 0, where δn = −
(
p (1 − p) (1 − F01 (0)) + (1 − p)2 ln (1 − p) v
)
measures the difference in ex ante payoffs of a bidder when the winning bid and the
losing bid are, respectively, disclosed. For the (p, v) pairs to the left of δn = 0 curve,
bidder’s payoff is higher when the seller discloses the winning bid.
4 Perfectly positively correlated valuations
I now consider the case when p01 = p10 = 0. As noted in the Introduction, this case
has already been studied in the literature for some disclosure rules although assuming
v = 1. To simplify notation, let us now denote p00 by p, and p11 by 1 − p. I again
assume that p ∈ (0, 1). Below I am going to establish a similar set of results as in the
case of negatively correlated values.
As before, let w and l be the winner and the loser of the first auction, respectively.
For i = w, l, let qi now be the probability that bidder i is of type (0, 0). Next, I
restate Lemma 1 but now I assume that qw ≤ ql . That is, I assume that the loser of the
first auction is now the weak bidder. I will verify that qw ≤ ql indeed holds once the
strategies for the first auction are stated.
22 One can also note that Hw(c)Hw((1−qw)v) = Gw (c), which is given in (1), and Hl (c) = Gl (c), which is
given in (2) when ql = 0. Thus, the equilibrium distribution of bids in the second auction is the same as the
one implied by Lemma 1.
23 F01, f10, b¯10, and b¯ refer to the functions and variables that are defined in Sect. 3.2. n is explicitly
calculate in Appendix B.
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Lemma 7 Type (0, 0) bids 0. Type (1, 1) bids v if ql = 0, and bids 0 if ql = 1. If
0 < ql < 1, then
1. Bidder w of type (1, 1) draws a bid c according to the distribution function
Gw (c) = ql1 − qw
v
v − c −
qw
1 − qw (8)
on the interval [0, (1 − ql)v], and puts a mass Gw(0) > 0 on bid 0 if qw < ql .
2. Bidder l of type (1, 1) draws a bid c according to the distribution function
Gl (c) = ql1 − ql
c
v − c (9)
on the interval [0, (1 − ql)v].
The equilibrium payoffs of types (0, 0) and (1, 1) are, respectively, 0 and qlv in the
second auction.
Similar to the case with negatively correlated valuations, the results that follow can
be interpreted in terms of the payoff that a type (1, 1) bidder expects in the second
auction. This payoff now depends on ql . Therefore, the equivalence between different
disclosure rules changes. Now, whenever the losing bid of the first auction is disclosed,
the winner will use this bid to calculate ql . Otherwise, he will use his own winning
bid. Also, as will be shown, ql is decreasing in the bids of the first auction whenever
the seller discloses something about the outcome of the first auction. Therefore, a type
(1, 1) bidder has incentives to bid less aggressively in the first auction, which hurts the
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seller’s revenue. Finally, whenever the losing bid is disclosed and 0 < ql < 1 holds,
the equilibrium outcome of the first auction must be pooling and, hence, inefficient.
For all the disclosure rules that I am going to consider, it is true that type (0, 0) bids
0 in the equilibrium of the first auction.24 That it is indeed an equilibrium strategy
will follow from the fact that the lowest bid that type (1, 1) submits in equilibrium, is
more or equal to 0. Therefore, I will omit the strategy of type (0, 0) bidder from the
propositions that follow. I also denote the equilibrium strategy of type (1, 1) in the
first auction by F (b).
4.1 When no information is disclosed
The equilibrium strategies are exactly the same as in Proposition 2 with types (0, 1)
and (1, 0) replaced by types (0, 0) and (1, 1), respectively, and ql = qw = p. The
equilibrium is efficient, the surplus is (1− p2)(1+v), the ex ante payoff of a bidder is
p(1− p)(1+ v), and the equilibrium revenue of the seller is equal to (1− p)2(1+ v).
4.2 Only the winning bid is disclosed
Here I assume that v ≤ 1.25
Proposition 8 Suppose v ≤ 1.
Item 1: F : [0, 1 − p + vp ln p] → [0, 1], where F is implicitly defined by26
(p + (1 − p) F (b)) (1 − b) − vp ln (p + (1 − p) F (b)) = p (1 − v ln p) .
(10)
Item 2: The bidders bid as specified in Lemma 7, where ql = qw = 1 if bw = 0,
otherwise qw = 0, and27
ql = pp + (1 − p) F (bw) . (11)
The equilibrium payoff of type (1, 1) is p(1 + v (1 − ln p)).
One can verify that F (0) = 0, which means that the equilibrium is efficient and the
surplus is (1− p2)(1+v). The ex ante equilibrium payoff of a bidder is p (1 − p) (1+
v (1 − ln p)). Hence, the seller’s revenue is given by
Rwp = (1 − p)2(1 + v) + 2p(1 − p)v ln p.
24 Note that I allow the bids to be negative.
25 For v > 1, I again failed to identify equilibrium strategies in the first auction, given the assumed
tie-breaking rule and the equilibrium strategies in the second auction as specified in Lemma 7.
26 That F is monotonically increasing is verified in the next subsection. There I need the assumption that
v ≤ 1.
27 If bw > 1 − p + vp ln p, then ql = p.
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It follows that the bidders gain and the seller loses compared to the case when no
information is revealed.
4.3 Only the winner’s identity is disclosed
Because the values of qi for i = w, l are not common knowledge between the bidders
when only the winner’s identity is disclosed, one cannot apply the results of Lemma 7 to
the second auction. In order to define the equilibrium strategies of the second auction,
I introduce the following function:
b (c) = c
v
+ (v − c) ln
(
1 − c
v
)
(12)
for c ∈ [0, (1 − p)v]. It will define an implicit mapping from the bids b of the first
auction into the bids c of the second auction. First, observe that the function in (12 )
is monotonically increasing,
db
dc
= 1 − v
v
− ln
(
1 − c
v
)
> 0
given that 0 ≤ c < v ≤ 1, and b takes values in [0, 1 − p + vp ln p]. Second, if one
defines a distribution function Hl (c) ≡ p1−p cv−c for c ∈ [0, (1 − p)v], then one can
verify that F(b(c)) = Hl(c) holds for F defined in (10). (Also, F ′ (b) b′ (c) = H ′l (c).
Because b′ (c) > 0 and H ′l (c) > 0, then indeed F ′ (b) > 0 in (10) as required.) From
F (b) = p1−p cv−c , one can rewrite (12) as
c = (1 − p) F (b)
p + (1 − p) F (b)v. (13)
Proposition 9 Suppose v ≤ 1.
Item 1: The bidders bid as in Proposition 8.
Item 2: Type (0, 0) bids 0. Bidder l of type (1, 1) bids cl , which is defined by (13)
for b = bl . Bidder w of type (1, 1) draws a bid c from the interval [0, cw]
according to
Hw (c) = v − cw
v − c
where cw is defined by (13) for b = bw .28 The equilibrium payoffs of types
(0, 0) and (1, 1) are, respectively, 0 and v − cw = qlv in the second auction
where ql is given by (11).
28 If type (1, 1) submitted a bid b /∈ [0, 1 − p + vp ln p] in the first auction, then he bids in the second
auction as if he had submitted b = 0 or b = 1 − p + vp ln p, whichever is closer to his actual bid in the
first auction.
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Note that the winner of the first auction does not know what cl is, but he knows that it
is less than cw and that the distribution of cl is Hl (cl )Hl (cw) , provided that the opponent’s type
is (1, 1). Therefore, from the perspective of the winner, type (1, 1) loser effectively
randomizes as specified in Lemma 7. Because type (1, 1) winner also randomizes as
specified in Lemma 7 (where qw = 0), the strategies in the second auction form an
equilibrium, in which both expect a payoff of v − cw = qlv. Further, conditional on
the bids of the first auction, the value of ql is the same whether the winning bid or
the winner’s identity are disclosed. This implies that the equilibrium strategies in the
first auction are also the same for both disclosure rules. Thus, one can conclude that
disclosing only the winning bid and disclosing only the winner’s identity are outcome
equivalent. Note, though, that the equivalence result was different when the valuations
were negatively correlated. In that case, disclosing the winner’s identity was equivalent
to disclosing only the losing bid.
4.4 Only the losing bid is disclosed
Here and in the next subsection, I do not require that v ≤ 1.
Proposition 10
Item 1: If p < 2v1+2v , then F :
[
0, 1 + pv − √pv (2 + pv)] → [0, 1], where
F (b) = p
1 − p
b
1 − b +
√
pv (2 + pv) − p(1 + v)
1 − p
1
1 − b . (14)
If 2v1+2v ≤ p < 1, then F : [0, 1 − p] → [0, 1], where
F (b) = p
1 − p
b
1 − b .
Item 2: The bidders bid as specified in Lemma 7, where qw = ql = 0 if bl > 0;
otherwise
qw =
1
2 p
1
2 (p + (1 − p) F (0)) + (1 − p) (1 − F (0))
,
ql = pp + (1 − p) F (0) .
The equilibrium payoff of type (1, 1) is √pv (2 + pv) when p < 2v1+2v and it is
p(1 + v) when 2v1+2v ≤ p < 1.
Note that F(0) = 0 in (14) when p = 2v1+2v . Therefore, the first expression for F
only applies when p < 2v1+2v . In this case, type (1, 1) bids 0 with a strictly positive
probability and, as a result, can lose to type (0, 0) opponent. Therefore, the equilibrium
is inefficient when p < 2v1+2v .
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When 2v1+2v ≤ p < 1, the bidders’ payoffs and the seller’s revenue in the equi-
librium are the same as in the case of no information disclosure. That is, the ex ante
payoff of a bidder is given by p(1 − p)(1 + v) and the seller’s revenue is given by
Rlp = (1 − p)2(1 + v).
When p < 2v1+2v , the ex ante equilibrium payoff of a bidder is (1−p)
√
pv (2 + pv).
The surplus in the first auction will be 0 if a bidder with 0 valuation wins that auction.
This happens with a probability of
p2 + 2p(1 − p)F(0) × 1
2
= p(√pv (2 + pv) − pv).
The surplus in the second auction is 0 if both bidders have 0 valuations, which happens
with a probability of p2. Hence, the surplus from both auctions is
1 − p(√pv (2 + pv) − pv) + (1 − p2)v = 1 + v − p√pv (2 + pv).
Finally, the seller’s revenue is given by
Rlp = 1 + v − p
√
pv (2 + pv) − 2(1 − p)√pv (2 + pv)
= 1 + v − (2 − p)√pv (2 + pv).
4.5 The winning and losing bids are disclosed
It turns out that the equilibrium outcome is equivalent to the one found in the case when
only the losing bid is disclosed, again, because the formula for ql remains unchanged.
Proposition 11 The equilibrium strategies are the same as in Proposition 10, except
that
qi =
{ p
p+(1−p)F(0) if bw = 0,
0 if bl > 0,
for i = w, l, and qw = 0 and ql = pp+(1−p)F(0) if 0 = bl < bw.
Proof It is easy to verify that the beliefs qi for i = w, l are consistent with the
strategies in the first auction, and that qw ≤ ql indeed holds. The only difference from
Proposition 10 is in the value of qw, but it does not affect the expected payoffs in the
second auction. Therefore, the equilibrium strategies in the first auction are exactly
the same as in Proposition 10. unionsq
4.6 The ranking of revenues
Again, given the outcome equivalence between several disclosure rules, it is enough
to consider the seller’s revenue for the following cases: no information is disclosed,
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only the winning bid is disclosed, and only the losing bid is disclosed. First of all, one
can verify that the seller’s revenue under non-disclosure, (1 − p)2(1 + v), (weakly)
exceeds both Rwp and Rlp. Thus, if the valuations are perfectly positively correlated,
the best that the seller can do, is not to disclose any information between the first and
second auctions. Alternatively, she can sell both objects in a simultaneous auction, in
which the bidders either submit separate bids for each object, or they each submit a
single bid for the bundle of both objects.
One may also want to compare Rwp and Rlp. Here I assume that v ≤ 1. Let p =
Rwp − Rlp. Then, p is given by
p =
{
(2 − p) (√pv (2 + pv) − p(1 + v)) + 2p (1 − p) v ln p if p < 2v1+2v ,
2p (1 − p) v ln p if 2v1+2v ≤ p < 1.
It immediately follows that p < 0 when 2v1+2v ≤ p < 1. p = 0 is plotted in Fig. 3.
For the values of p and v to the left of p = 0, disclosing the winning bid is better,
otherwise disclosing the losing bid is better. In particular, if p exceeds p∗ ≈ 0.2325,
disclosing the losing bid is better for all values of v. The intuition for the ranking of
revenues is simple when 2v1+2v ≤ p < 1: although the surplus under both disclosure
rules is the same, the bidders expect higher payoff when the winning bid is disclosed.
On the other hand, if p < 2v1+2v , the surplus is not maximized when the losing bid
is disclosed. This should work in favour of disclosing the winning bid. However, for
many parameter values, this effect is reversed by the fact that the bidders also bid
more aggressively and, consequently, expect lower payoffs when the losing bid is
disclosed. This is illustrated in Fig. 3 by δp = 0 where δp = p (1 + v (1 − ln p)) −√
pv (2 + pv) is the difference in a bidder’s payoff when the winning bid and the
losing bid, respectively, are disclosed.
5 Discussion
I have established relationships between different disclosure rules and compared them
in terms of the seller’s revenue and efficiency. In this section, I discuss if and how the
results change if we relax the assumptions of the model. Specifically, I will consider
what happens if the valuations are imperfectly correlated across items; if they are
asymmetrically distributed across bidders; and if there are more then two bidders.
I will mainly focus on the cases when only the winning bid is announced and when
nothing is announced. I will also consider an example of more sophisticated disclosure
rule. For simplicity, I set v = 1 in this section. The results of this section are formally
stated and proven in the working paper version of the article ( ¯Azacis 2019, Appendix
C).
5.1 Imperfect correlation of valuations
It has been found that the seller benefits from revealing some information about the
outcome of the first auction prior to the second auction if the valuations are perfectly
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Fig. 3 The ranking of revenues
negatively correlated, but she is better off not to reveal anything if the valuations are
perfectly positively correlated. Furthermore, if the valuations are not correlated across
items, then the disclosure rule is irrelevant. This suggests that the results that have been
established for perfect correlation of valuations, might continue to hold for imperfect
correlation of valuations as long as the sign of correlation does not change. To verify
this intuition, I consider two special cases.
First, I assume that the valuations of each bidder are distributed across items as
follows: p10 = p01 =  and p00 = p11 = 12 −  where 0 ≤  ≤ 14 .  = 0
corresponds to the case analysed in Sect. 3, while  = 14 implies that the valuations
across items are independently distributed. When 0 <  < 14 , the valuations of the two
items are negatively, but imperfectly correlated. In this case, each bidder can be one
of four types with a strictly positive probability. If the winning bid of the first auction
is revealed, I find that in the first auction, type (0, 1) randomizes on
[
0, b
]
interval,
type (1, 1) randomizes on adjacent [b, b] interval, type (1, 0) randomizes on [0, b]
interval, while type (0, 0) bids 0. (See the top panel in Fig. 4.) In the limit, when  goes
to 0, the equilibrium converges to the one given in Proposition 3 for the case when
pv < 1 − e−v (with p = 12 and v = 1). Since type (0, 1) wins with a strictly positive
probability when facing type (1, 0) opponent, the equilibrium, as in Proposition 3, is
inefficient. Also, similar to the results in Sect. 3.2, the seller’s revenue is higher while
bidder’s payoff is lower compared to the situation when no information is disclosed.
Also, I find that disclosing both bids is still equivalent to disclosing only the winning
bid.
Second, I assume that the valuations of each bidder are distributed across items
as follows: p10 = p01 = 12 −  and p00 = p11 =  where 0 ≤  ≤ 14 .
 = 0 corresponds to the case analysed in Sect. 4, while  = 14 again implies
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Fig. 4 Equilibrium strategies when  = 18
that the valuations across items are independently distributed. When 0 <  < 14 ,
the valuations of the items are positively, but imperfectly correlated. If only the
winning bid of the first auction is revealed, I find that in equilibrium, type (1, 1)
randomizes on
[
0, b
]
, type (1, 0) randomizes on
[
b, b
]
interval where b > 0, while
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types (0, 0) and (0, 1) always bid 0 in the first auction. (See the bottom panel in
Fig. 4.) In the limit, when  goes to 0, the equilibrium converges to the one given
in Proposition 8 (with p = 12 and v = 1). Similar to the results in that proposi-
tion, the equilibrium is efficient for all  ∈ (0, 14
)
. Also, as in Sect. 4.2, information
disclosure leads to lower revenue for the seller and to higher payoffs for the bid-
ders.29
5.2 Asymmetric distribution of valuations
Here I generalize Proposition 3 to the case of asymmetric distribution of valuations. It
is still assumed that p00 = p11 = 0 for both bidders, but now p01 = p1 for bidder 1
and p01 = p2 for bidder 2 with p1 ≥ p2. I find that when only the winning bid of the
first auction is revealed, both types of both bidders randomize over exactly the same
interval
[
0, b
]
in equilibrium, provided that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ b holds. (When p1 = p2 ≥ b,
this corresponds to the case when pv ≥ 1 − e−v and v = 1 in Proposition 3.)
Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium strategies for p1 = 0.7 and p2 = 0.5.30 Clearly,
the equilibrium is still inefficient. I have also verified that compared to the case when
no information is disclosed, the announcement of the winning bid always lowers the
joint payoff of the bidders and raises the seller’s revenue, which is consistent with the
results in Sect. 3.2.
Because the bidders are asymmetric, the equivalence between disclosing only the
winning bid and disclosing both bids does not hold anymore. Given the strategies
of the first auction when only the winning bid is disclosed, one can show that (1 −
p1) f 110(b) > (1 − p2) f 210(b) holds for b > 0. Further, if both bw and bl are disclosed
and they are sufficiently close to each other, then qw ≥ ql will only hold if (1 −
pw) f w10(bw) > (1 − pl) f l10(bl) holds. However, this will be violated if bidder 1 loses
the first auction (that is, l = 1 and w = 2). Therefore, the equilibrium strategies when
only the winning bid is disclosed, cease to form an equilibrium when both bids are
disclosed.31
29 With perfectly positively correlated valuations, if only the winner’s identity is announced, then at the
start of the second auction, one of the bidders has private information about his valuation, while the other
bidder has private information about his belief about the first bidder’s valuation. This allowed to construct
equilibrium strategies for the second auction and to show that the equilibrium outcome is the same as
when the winning bid is announced. With imperfectly positively correlated valuations, if the bidders bid
in the first auction as just described but only the winner’s identity is announced, then at the start of the
second auction, each bidder has private information both about his valuation and about his belief about the
opponent’s valuation. This make it hard to construct the equilibrium strategies for the second auction and
suggests that the equivalence between the two disclosure policies does not hold anymore.
30 The superscript to the distribution function denotes the bidder.
31 It was problematic to identify the equilibria in the case of asymmetric bidders and positively correlated
valuations. I constructed an equilibrium when both bids are announced. This equilibrium resembles the one
given in Proposition 11. However, to construct it, I needed to adopt a very particular tie-breaking rule for
the first auction, namely, the probability with which the item is assigned to, say, bidder 1 in the case of tie,
is continuously changing in the values of p1 and p2.
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Fig. 5 Equilibrium strategies when p1 = 0.7 and p2 = 0.5
5.3 More than two bidders
Next, I consider the case of n ≥ 2 bidders. Kannan (2012) has already analysed this
case when the valuations are perfectly positively correlated and either the winning
bid or all bids are announced. He finds that the equilibria are qualitatively the same
when n = 2 and when n > 2. Specifically, as in Proposition 8, when only the winning
bid is announced, type (1, 1) bidders bid above 0 with probability 1 and, hence, the
equilibrium is efficient. And as in Proposition 11, when all bids are announced, type
(1, 1) bidders bid 0 with a strictly positive probability and, hence, the equilibrium is
inefficient.
I focus now on the case when the valuations are perfectly negatively correlated,
but first I characterize the equilibrium behaviour and payoffs in the second auction.
This characterization, though, does not depend on the sign of correlation between
the valuations of the items. I start by introducing some additional terminology and
notation. I will say that a bidder, depending on his valuation of the second item, is of
type 0 or 1 in the second auction. Let qi (i = 1, . . . , n) denote the probability that
bidder i is of type 0. Suppose (w.l.o.g.) that q1 ≤ q2 ≤ · · · ≤ qn . I show that in
equilibrium, bidder i randomizes over the interval
[
ci , cn+1
]
where 0 ≤ c1 = c2 ≤
· · · ≤ cn ≤ cn+1. If qi = qi+1, then ci = ci+1 and bidders i and i + 1 have identical
equilibrium strategies. The payoff of type 1 bidder is nj=2q j , while that of type 0 is
0.
Note that the payoff of type 1 bidder does not depend on the probability of the
bidder who is the least likely to have the low valuation. Therefore, the disclosure rules
that only differ how q1 is updated based on the bidding in the first auction, must be
123
H. A¯zacis
equivalent. We have seen that with the negatively correlated valuations, qi is increasing
in the bids of the first auction. Therefore, the bidder who submits the lowest bid in the
first auction, is the least likely to have the low valuation for the second item. Therefore,
the disclosure rule when all bids are announced, must be equivalent to the disclosure
rule when all but the lowest bid are announced. A similar argument holds when the
valuations are positively correlated, except that then qi is decreasing in the bids of the
first auction.
Furthermore, even if two disclosure rules lead to different updated values of qi for
i = 2, . . . , n given the bids of the first auction, these disclosure rules can still be
equivalent. Specifically, I find that when the valuations are negatively correlated and
there are at least 3 bidders, the equilibrium outcomes and equilibrium payoffs are the
same when no information about the first auction is announced and when only the
winning bid is announced. In the equilibrium, type (0, 1) bidders bid 0 and type (1, 0)
bidders bid strictly above 0 in the first auction and it is the other way around in the
second auction. As a result, the equilibrium outcome is efficient.
Note that it is different in the two bidder case. There, a type (0, 1) bidder bids above
0 with a strictly positive probability in the first auction and the outcome is inefficient.
If in the two bidder case, type (0, 1) bidders were expected to bid 0 for sure as in the
n > 2 case, then a type (0, 1) bidder would have incentives to deviate by submitting
a small but positive bid. This way he can secure a payoff of almost 1 in the second
auction: either he loses the first auction and learns that his opponent will bid 0 in the
second auction, or he wins and makes the opponent to believe that he will bid 0 in the
second auction. With 3 or more bidders, such a deviation has only a marginal effect
on the payoff in the second auction as there still remains uncertainty about the types
of other bidders. And this marginal change in the payoff from the second auction is
outweighed by the cost of winning the first auction with a bid above one’s valuation.32
5.4 Other disclosure rules
I have studied simple, “natural” disclosure rules, but the seller could also adopt a more
sophisticated disclosure rule. I now consider an example of such more sophisticated
rule and show that it outperforms the simple rules in the case of negatively correlated
valuations. The disclosure rule that I consider is as follows. The seller announces that
the winning bid of the first auction is bw if bw < k where k is some threshold value,
but she announces that the losing bid is bl if bw ≥ k. To emphasize, the seller does
not just announce a number. She also reveals whether she announces the winning or
losing bid. Said differently, she reveals whether or not the bids (bw, bl) belong to the
set B = {(bw, bl)|bw < k}.
The bidding strategies of the first auction are similar to the ones in Proposition 5
when only the losing bid is disclosed. In that proposition, type (0, 1) randomizes on
an interval [1 − p, b], while type (1, 0) randomizes on an adjacent interval [b, b]. By
choosing k > 1 − p, b is now pushed to the right. Although type (0, 1) still expects
32 Although I have not derive the equilibrium strategies when all bids of the first auction are announced, I
have verified that with 3 bidders, it cannot be an equilibrium where type (0, 1) bidders bid 0 and type (1, 0)
bidders bid strictly above 0 in the first auction.
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the same payoff as in the case when only the losing bid is disclosed, type (1, 0) must
now bid more aggressively because of higher b and, as a result, expects smaller payoff.
This, in turn, means higher revenue for the seller.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3 First of all, one can verify that the bidders’ beliefs at the start
of the second auction, as described by the first expression for each qi for i = w, l, are
consistent with the strategies of the first auction. (Although, bidder l additionally knows
his losing bid, it does not provide any additional information about the opponent’s
type.) Further, the density functions for 0 ≤ b ≤ b¯ are given by
f01 (b) = F01 (0) v + ln (1 − b)
v (1 − b)2 ,
f10 (b) = F01 (0) p1 − p
− ln (1 − b)
v (1 − b)2 .
One can verify that f01 (b) > 0 and f10 (b) > 0 for all 0 < b < b¯ as required. Using
these expressions for f01 (b) and f10 (b), one can simplify the expressions for qw and
ql when 0 ≤ bw ≤ b¯:
qw = − ln (1 − bw)
v
,
ql = −bw + ln (1 − bw)
v
.
Hence, ql ≤ qw clearly holds, therefore one can apply Lemma 1. Finally, one can also
verify that f01
(
1 − e−v) = 0. This is important because it ensures that there is no
discrete jump in qw at bw = b¯ = 1 − e−v when pv < 1 − e−v . Consequently, qw = 1
for all b ≥ b¯ when pv < 1 − e−v .
Next, we consider the bidders’ behaviour in the first auction. Consider type (0, 1).
If he bids in the interval
[
0, b¯
]
, his joint payoff from both auctions is33
π01 = (pF01 (b) + (1 − p) F10 (b)) × (−b)
33 If b = 0, we need to consider ties. However, the first two terms in the payoff expression will be zero
for any tie-breaking rule.
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+ (pF01 (b) + (1 − p) F10 (b)) × (1 − p) f10 (b)p f01 (b) + (1 − p) f10 (b) × v
+ (p (1 − F01 (b)) + (1 − p) (1 − F10 (b)))
×
∫ b¯10
b
v × (1 − p) f10 (s)
p f01 (s) + (1 − p) f10 (s)
× p f01 (s) + (1 − p) f10 (s)
p (1 − F01 (b)) + (1 − p) (1 − F10 (b))ds,
where the first term is the bidder’s payoff from the first auction, the second and third
terms are his payoff from the second auction if he has, respectively, won and lost the
first auction,34 and b¯10 = b¯ if pv ≥ 1 − e−v , and b¯10 = 1 − pvev−1 otherwise. If we
simplify the above expression, we obtain that
π01 = − (pF01 (b) + (1 − p) F10 (b)) (b + ln (1 − b)) + (1 − p) (1 − F10 (b)) v
= (1 − p)v,
where the last equality follows from substituting the expressions for F01 (b) and
F10 (b).
If he bids above b¯, the expression for the payoff depends on whether pv < 1− e−v
or pv ≥ 1−e−v . If pv < 1−e−v , then qw = 1 and for b ∈
(
b¯, 1 − pv
ev−1
]
, the payoff
is
(p + (1 − p) F10 (b)) (v − b) + (1 − p) (1 − F10 (b)) v = v
(
1 − p
ev − 1
b
1 − b
)
,
where I have used (4). Because b > b¯ = 1 − e−v , this payoff is less than (1 − p)v.
For b > 1 − pv
ev−1 , the payoff is
v − b < v − 1 + pv
ev − 1 < v − 1 + e
−v < (1 − p)v.
If pv ≥ 1 − e−v , then for b > b¯ the payoff is
−b + (1 − p) f10
(
b¯
)
p f01
(
b¯
)+ (1 − p) f10
(
b¯
)v= − b − ln (1 − b¯)
< −b¯ − ln (1 − b¯) = (1 − p)v.
It follows that the payoff of type (0, 1) is maximized for b ∈ [0, b¯]. Thus, it is indeed
optimal for this type to randomize on this interval.
Consider type (1, 0). If he bids in the interval
(
0, b¯
]
, his expected payoff is
π10 = (pF01 (b) + (1 − p) F10 (b)) (1 − b) = pF01 (0) ,
34 Recall that the payoff of type (0, 1) from the second auction is given by qwv, where qw depends on the
winning bid of the first auction.
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where the last equality follows from substituting the expressions for F01 (b) and
F10 (b). If pv < 1 − e−v , then for any b ∈
(
b¯, 1 − pv
ev−1
]
, the expected payoff
is
(p + (1 − p) F10 (b)) (1 − b) = pF01 (0) ,
where I have used (4). If he bids 0, then his expected payoff is 12 pF01 (0), given the tie-
breaking rule. If he bids above b¯10, his expected payoff is 1−b < 1− b¯10 = pF01 (0).
Thus, this type is indifferent between all bids
(
0, b¯10
]
and, hence, is indeed willing to
randomize according to F10 (b). unionsq
Proof of Proposition 5 First, the bidders’ beliefs at the start of the second auction, as
described by qw and ql , are derived from the strategies of the first auction using Bayes’
rule whenever possible. Second, because ql ≤ qw holds, one can apply Lemma 1 to
the second auction.
We now turn to the first auction. First, however, note that given the specified strate-
gies, ties will arise with zero probability. (In particular, limb→((1−p)v)+ F01 (b) = 0.)
Consider type (0, 1). If he bids in the interval
[
(1 − p)v,− ln (1 − p) 1−pp v
]
, his
expected payoff from both auctions is
π01 = pF01 (b) (−b) + (1 − p + p (1 − F01 (b))) 1 − p1 − p + p (1 − F01 (b))v
+pF01 (b)
∫ b
(1−p)v
1 − p
1 − p + p (1 − F01 (s))v
f01 (s)
F01 (b)
ds
= pF01 (b) (−b) + (1 − p)v − (1 − p) v
∫ b
(1−p)v
d (1 − pF01 (s))
1 − pF01 (s)
= pF01 (b) (−b) + (1 − p)v − (1 − p) ln (1 − pF01 (b)) v
= (1 − p)v,
where the last equality follows from the definition of F01 (b) in (5). Thus, type (0, 1)
is indifferent between all bids in the interval
[
(1 − p)v,− ln (1 − p) 1−pp v
]
. If this
type bids below (1 − p)v, he expects the same payoff as when bidding (1 − p)v. If
he bids above − ln (1 − p) 1−pp v, he expects a payoff of
(p + (1 − p) F10 (b)) (−b) + (1 − p)v − (1 − p) ln (1 − p) v
= (p + (1 − p) ln (1 − p) v) −b
1 − b + (1 − p)(1 − ln (1 − p))v,
which is decreasing in b because p + (1 − p) ln (1 − p) v > 0. It follows that it is
indeed optimal for type (0, 1) to randomize according to F01 (b) in the first auction.
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Consider type (1, 0). If he bids in the interval
[
− ln (1 − p) 1−pp v, (1 − p)
(1 − ln (1 − p) v)
]
, his expected payoff is
π10 = (p + (1 − p) F10 (b)) (1 − b)
=
(
p + (1 − p) p
1 − p
b + ln (1 − p) 1−pp v
1 − b
)
(1 − b)
= p + (1 − p) ln (1 − p) v.
If he bids above (1 − p) (1 − ln (1 − p) v) , he clearly expects less. If he bids below
− ln (1 − p) 1−pp , his payoff is
pF01 (b) (1 − b) = pF01 (b) + (1 − p) ln (1 − pF01 (b)) v,
where I have used (5). One can verify that the last expression is increasing in b for
v ≤ 1. Thus, it follows that it is indeed optimal for type (1, 0) to randomize according
to F10 (b) in the first auction. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 6 We solve for the equilibrium strategies backwards, starting with
the second auction. Given the specified strategies, it is clear that type (1, 0) finds it
optimal to bid 0 for any beliefs about the type of the opponent. It remains to check
the optimality of type (0, 1) strategies. At the beginning of second auction, bidder w
of type (0, 1) believes that the opponent is of type (1, 0) with probability ql = 0. His
expected payoff at the start of the second auction is
Hl (c) (v − c) = qwv
for all c ∈ [0, (1 − qw)v] and it is v−c < qwv for c > (1−qw)v. Thus, this bidder is
willing to bid cw as long as cw ≤ (1 − qw)v = p(1−F01(bl ))1−p+p(1−F01(bl )) v = cl where the first
equality follows from (6) and the second equality is simply a definition (cl ≡ c(bl)).
Because c (b) is decreasing in b and bw ≥ bl , it is indeed true that cw ≤ cl .
On the other hand, bidder l of type (0, 1) believes that the opponent is of type (1, 0)
with probability qw, which is given in (6). Furthermore, conditional on his first auction
losing bid bl and conditional on the opponent being of type (0, 1), bidder l believes
that the opponent’s bid in the first auction exceeds b with probability 1−F01(b)1−F01(bl ) , or
equivalently that the opponent’s bid in the second auction is less than c with probability
Hw(c)
Hw(cl ) where cl = (1 − qw)v. Therefore, the expected payoff of this type at the start
of the second auction is
(
qw + (1 − qw) Hw (c)Hw (cl)
)
(v − c) .
Substituting the expressions for qw and Hw (c), we obtain that
(
1 − p + p (1 − F01 (bl)) Hw(c)Hw(cl )
1 − p + p (1 − F01 (bl))
)
(v − c) = 1 − p
1 − p + p (1 − F01 (bl))v = qwv
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for all c ∈ [0, (1 − qw)v]. If he bids above (1 − qw)v, his payoff is clearly less
than qwv. Because this type of bidder is indifferent between all bids in the interval
[0, (1 − qw)v], it is indeed optimal to randomize according to Hl (c).
Hence, type (0, 1) expects a payoff of qwv, which depends on bl , in the second
auction whether or not he has won the first auction. It immediately follows that the
equilibrium strategies in the first auction are exactly the same as the ones in Proposi-
tion 5. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 8 First, the beliefs at the start of the second auction round are
consistent with the first round strategies. Second, qw ≤ ql holds. Third, the lowest bid
that type (1, 1) submits in the first auction is 0, therefore it is indeed optimal for type
(0, 0) to bid 0 in that auction.
The expected payoff of type (1, 1) bidder at the start of the first auction is
(p + (1 − p) F (b)) (1 − b) + (p + (1 − p) F (b)) pv
p + (1 − p) F (b)
+ (1 − p) (1 − F (b))
∫ b¯
b
pv
p + (1 − p) F (s)
f (s)
1 − F (b)ds
where the first term is the bidder’s payoff from the first auction, the second and third
terms are his payoff from the second auction if he has, respectively, won and lost the
first auction,35 and b¯ ≡ 1 − p + vp ln p. After simplification, we obtain
(p + (1 − p) F (b)) (1 − b) + vp − vp ln (p + (1 − p) F (b)) .
Substituting the expression for F (b) from (10) implies that the payoff is equal to
p(1 + v (1 − ln p)) for all b ∈ [0, b¯]. Clearly, the payoff is strictly lower if the bidder
bids above b¯. Hence, a bidder with the valuation profile (1, 1) is indeed willing to
randomize according to F (b) in the first auction. This completes the proof. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 9 It is trivial to see that it is optimal for type (0, 0) to bid 0 in both
auctions, given the strategy of the opponent. Consider type (1, 1). We start with the
second auction. Prior to the second auction, bidder l (of type (1, 1)) believes that the
opponent’s type is (0, 0) with probability qw = 0, while bidder w believes that his
opponent’s type is (0, 0) with probability ql , which is given in (11).
The expected payoff of bidder l, conditional on cw, is
Hw (c) (v − c) = v − cw
for all c ≤ cw and it is v − c < v − cw for any c > cw. Thus, even if bidder l does not
know what cw is, he knows that his payoff is maximized at c = cl (because cl ≤ cw).
The expected payoff of bidder w is
(
ql + (1 − ql) Hl (c)Hl (cw)
)
(v − c) .
35 Recall that the payoff of type (1, 1) from the second auction is given by qlv, where ql depends on the
winning bid of the first auction according to (11).
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Substituting the expressions for ql and Hl (c) in the payoff function and noting that
F (bw) = Hl (cw), we obtain that the payoff is v − cw for c ≤ cw, but the payoff is
v − c < v − cw for c > cw. Thus, bidder w is indeed willing to randomize according
to Hw (c).
Note that from (11) and (13 ), cw = (1 − ql)v. It follows that type (1, 1) expects a
payoff of qlv in the second auction whether he wins or loses the first auction. From this
and the fact that the relationship between ql and bw is the same as when the winning
bid is disclosed, it immediately follows that the equilibrium strategy of type (1, 1) in
the first auction is exactly the same as the one given in Proposition 8. This completes
the proof. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 10 The beliefs prior to the second auction are indeed consistent
with the bidding strategies of the first auction; qw ≤ ql holds; type (0, 0) bidder finds
it optimal to bid 0 in the first auction.
Consider type (1, 1) in the first auction when p < 2v1+2v . If he bids b > 0, then his
expected payoff is
(p + (1 − p) F (b)) (1 − b) + (p + (1 − p) F (0)) × pv
p + (1 − p) F (0)
+ (1 − p) (1 − F (0)) × 0.
If he bids b = 0, then the payoff is
(p + (1 − p) F (0)) × 1
2
× 1 + pv
p + (1 − p) F (0) .
Substituting the expression for F (b), it follows that the expected payoff both from
bidding b > 0 and from bidding b = 0 is the same and equal to √pv (2 + pv).
Obviously, the bidder has no incentives to bid above b¯ = 1 + pv − √pv (2 + pv) as
it is dominated by bidding b¯.
When 2v1+2v ≤ p < 1, type (1, 1) expects
(p + (1 − p) F (b)) (1 − b) + p × v + (1 − p) × 0 = p(1 + v)
for 0 < b ≤ 1 − p. If he bids b = 0, his expected payoff is
p × 1
2
× 1 + v,
which is (weakly) less than p(1 + v) when 2v1+2v ≤ p < 1. He has no incentives to
bid above 1 − p either. We conclude that F is indeed the equilibrium strategy of type
(1, 1) bidder in the first auction. unionsq
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B Calculating 1n
Here, using the results of Sect. 3.2, I calculate explicitly
n = p
(∫ b¯10
0
F01 (b) f10 (b) db − F01 (0)
)
+ (1 − p) ln (1 − p) v.
When pv ≥ 1 − e−v , the integral in the above expression is given by
− (1 − b¯)
2
p(1 − p)v2
∫ b¯
0
(v + b + ln (1 − b)) ln (1 − b)
(1 − b)3 db =
b¯2 + 2p (1 − p) v
4p (1 − p) v ,
where I have used the relationship ln
(
1 − b¯) = −b¯ − (1 − p) v. Hence,
n = b¯
2 + 2p (1 − p) v
4 (1 − p) v −
(
1 − b¯) + (1 − p) ln (1 − p) v,
and b¯ is given by v(1 − p) + b¯ + ln (1 − b¯) = 0.
When pv < 1 − e−v , the integral is given by
1 − F10
(
1 − e−v) +
∫ 1−e−v
0
F01 (b) f10 (b) db
= 1 + p
1 − p
1 − v − e−v
1 − e−v −
p
1 − p
1
(ev − 1)2
∫ 1−e−v
0
(v + b + ln (1 − b)) ln (1 − b)
(1 − b)3 db
= 1 + p
1 − p
ev − vev − 1
ev − 1 −
1
4
p
1 − p
−v − 4ev + 2e2v − 3ve2v + 4vev + 2
(ev − 1)2 .
Hence,
n = p
(
1 + 3pv − 4v − 2p + 2pe
v − pvev
4 (ev − 1) (1 − p)
)
+ (1 − p) ln (1 − p) v.
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